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Abstract: 
Non-consensual contraceptive sterilisation of people with learning difficulties is 
inherently controversial. As such any legal framework that provides for such a 
procedure needs to rigorously scrutinised in terms of its adequacy to protect 
vulnerable people. This article aims to ‘determine whether the post-MCA judicial 
approach adequately protects adults with learning difficulties against needless non-
consensual contraceptive sterilisation’.2 This will be achieved by assessing how the 
MCA has changed the judicial approach to non-consensual contraceptive sterilisation 
since the common law approach. Further comparisons will also be made between 
sterilisation and vasectomies. The capacity section will determine whether the 
judiciary are approaching the capacity assessment in a proactive way that aims to 
uphold autonomy where possible. The best interests section will determine whether 
the judiciary is adopting an approach that sincerely promotes the patient’s best 
interests and genuinely upholds the least restrictive principle or whether their 
protection is undermined by a risk of prejudice, insincere motives and subjectivity. 
Finally, The human rights section will assess whether any Articles within the 
European Convention on Human Rights can offer patients reliable protection against 
needless sterilisation. 
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Introduction 
Non-consensual sterilisation of people with learning difficulties is a controversial topic 
that requires strong legal protection. This controversy is largely due to the forced 
sterilisation of some 3.5million people under the Nazi regime and widespread 
                                                        
1
 Jordane is currently undertaking a MSc in Socio-legal Studies at Bristol University.  
2
 ‘Sterilisation’ within this article concerns any medical procedure intending to render a patient 
permanently infertile. ‘Learning difficulty’ is defined as ‘delayed or incomplete intellectual 
development combined with some form of social malfunction. Martin, E., Concise Medical 
Dictionary (Oxford Reference Paperback) (2010) p.412.  
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eugenic policies across the USA and Europe during the twentieth century. 3 
Interestingly the domestic judiciary have consistently denied any eugenic influence4 
and there has never been any domestic legislation specifically governing sterilisation 
in this context. Rather the issue became governed by a best interest assessment 
under common law as enshrined by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). This article 
will assess the adequacy of the judiciary’s approach in protecting people with 
learning difficulties against needless sterilisation. The judicial approach to assessing 
capacity and best interests will be scrutinised. This will be followed by an analysis of 
whether any European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Articles can reliably 
protect patients against needless sterilisation. 
 
1 Capacity Assessments 
Pre-Mental Capacity Act Capacity Assessment 
The first step in determining the lawfulness of sterilisation is assessing the patient’s 
capacity to consent. In order to uphold autonomy where possible the post-Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) judicial approach should endorse a genuine assessment of 
capacity separate from best interest considerations. To assess this, it is first 
important to analyse the pre-MCA approach when determining capacity. The 
common law established a presumption of capacity to ensure autonomy was not 
arbitrarily disposed of. In Re T Donaldson LJ confirmed ‘the right to decide one's own 
fate presupposes a capacity to do so’.5 The presumption theoretically protected a 
person’s autonomy by requiring incapacity to be positively shown. Here, Donaldson 
LJ rebutted the presumption because T lacked capacity as she was in severe pain 
and disorientated at the time. 6  Unfortunately no guidance was given on the 
presumption’s conceptual basis. Pattinson argues the judiciary merely rubber-
stamped medical opinion when rebutting the presumption.7 Arguably Donaldson LJ’s 
findings were not based on objective principles that could be used in future cases. 
Rather his reasoning depended on fact-specific observations supplied by doctors. 
Although each case will differ, it is desirable to assess facts in the context of defined 
objective principles to encourage certainty. Consequently the protection of patient 
                                                        
3
 Suter. S., ‘A Brave New World for Designer Babies? (2007) 22(897) BerkeleyTechnology 
Law Journal 898, p.915. 
4
 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199 p.204 per Bridge LJ ‘this case has 
nothing whatever to do with eugenic theory’. 
5
 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam. 95 p.112. 
6
 Ibid., p.111.  
7
 Pattinson, S., Medical Law and Ethics, (2011, Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 edn.) p.175. 
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autonomy was undermined because the presumption was open to subjective and 
arbitrary decisions.  
 
Clear legal principle was needed to promote consistency. Re C 8  involved a 
schizophrenic whose capacity was assessed after refusing an amputation. Thorpe LJ 
established a cumulative test to rebut the presumption of capacity. Regarding the 
relevant information, the patient must be unable to comprehend and retain it, believe 
it and weigh it in the balance to decide.9  The patient must also understand the 
‘nature, purpose and effects’ of the treatment.10 Thus people with learning difficulties 
were not deemed incapacitated because of their condition. Instead a more principled 
approach was developed that could be consistently applied to any facts.  
 
Interestingly, Ashton DJ points out that C recovered without the amputation.11 This 
shows the importance of an accurate assessment of the need for treatment and 
capacity as a preliminary and separate step to avoid unwarranted paternalism. 
Indeed C had capacity12 so any talk of his best interests was irrelevant. Therefore 
this shows the vital distinction between assessing capacity and assessing best 
interests. This ensures patients are not simply deemed incapable so assessors can 
impose their subjective opinion regarding the patient’s sterilisation. The distinction 
was reaffirmed in NHS v T.13 where Charles J stressed that a capable patient’s 
decision must be respected regardless of their medical best interests.14 Hence if the 
patient had capacity and decided against sterilisation, third party views to the 
contrary were irrelevant. Theoretically this endorsed autonomy whilst shielding 
against harmful paternalism. However, the principle was arguably counterintuitive, 
making it appealing to present a patient as unable to understand the information and 
hence incapacitated. Therefore, patients were still at risk of being deemed 
incapacitated so assessors could impose a best interest assessment satisfying their 
own subjective views.  
 
                                                        
8
 Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290.  
9
 Ibid, p.295 per Thorpe LJ. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 District Judge Aston, ‘Justice and Incompetence’,(2005) 73 Medico-Legal Journal Part 2. 
12
 Re C p.295. 
13
 The NHS Trust v Ms T (Adult Patient: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2004] EWHC 1279 
(Fam).  
14
 Ibid, p.42.  
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Re C also gave guidance on the test’s approach. Thorpe LJ held that C’s 
schizophrenia did not deprive him of the capacity to make ‘the decision in question’.15 
Rather than determining C’s capacity by his medical status, Thorpe LJ’s assessment 
solely concerned the issue of amputation. This functional approach enhances 
autonomy by recognising that each decision requires a different formulation of factors 
to establish capacity. Moreover each patient has varying symptoms affecting their 
level of capacity. Brazier notes that in Re P,16 P, aged 17, had a mental age of 6 but 
good communication skills and could cope with her bodily needs. In Re B, B was also 
17 yet could only communicate to the level of a 2 year-old and understand speech 
like a 6 year-old.17 Hence specific symptoms and abilities can vary greatly between 
patients despite equal diagnosis and chronological age. Furthermore, like B’s 
communication and understanding skills, each patient will have varying abilities 
according to the specific skill needed for any decision. Accordingly a status, rather 
than issue specific assessment would yield discriminatory and illogical results. 
Therefore in theory this approach enabled patients to retain autonomy in the greatest 
amount of decisions possible.  
 
Despite these principles the judiciary’s explicit assessment of capacity was 
inconsistent. Re S 18  involved the sterilisation of a woman with severe learning 
difficulties. Summing up Wall J’s earlier ruling Butler-Sloss LJ noted ‘common ground 
that S lacked capacity to consent to treatment of any kind’.19 She accepted that the 
court did not separately assess capacity and, since it not being a ground for appeal, 
did not assess it either. The perfunctory acceptance of incapacity is alarming. S was 
deemed incapacitated yet no explicit rebuttal of the presumption was given by either 
court. Herring contends that the courts were too readily deeming patients 
incapacitated in sterilisation cases. 20  Arguably ‘severe learning difficulties’ is 
adequate proof of incapacity. However, this argument is incorrect under the 
functional approach because it would lead to presuming incapacity based on a 
patient’s diagnosed condition. Therefore common law sterilisation cases lacked 
proactive assessment regarding capacity. This undermined the patient’s protection 
due to over-zealous medical professionals able to influence a judgment favouring 
                                                        
15
 Re C p.295 per Thorpe LJ ‘Although his general capacity is impaired by schizophrenia, it 
has not been established that he does not sufficiently understand the nature, purpose and 
effects of the treatment he refuses’. 
16
 Re P (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1989] 1 FLR 182. 
17
 Brazier, M., Cave, E., Medicine, Patients and the Law, (2007, London: Penguin), p.285. 
18
 Sl (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) v Sl (her mother) [2000] WL 571291. 
19
 Ibid, p.3.  
20
 Herring, J., Medical Law and Ethics, (2012, Oxford University Press, 4
th
 edn.), p.283. 
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sterilisation. Consequently the merits of the common law approach to assessing 
capacity lacked adequate practical protection.  
 
Post-Mental Capacity Act Capacity Assessments 
Section 1(2) MCA enshrined the common law presumption of capacity. Bartlett 
submits that the MCA does not overrule the preceding case law, but using common 
law precedent too prescriptively will undermine the statute. 21  Accordingly, the 
judiciary might make detrimental use of precedent leading to little improvement under 
the MCA. Mackenzie argues that this ‘key principle’ provides important legislative 
rights.22 This indicates that the presumption’s status is now more potent; enshrining 
the presumption should ensure it is adhered to and autonomy is retained where 
genuinely possible. However, the judiciary must employ genuine observation of the 
presumption. Re K23 is the only post-MCA female contraceptive sterilisation case. 
Cobb J begins by committing paragraphs 23-25 to assessing capacity.24 This starting 
point shows a promising post-MCA approach. It better protects patients against 
unwarranted paternalism because the judiciary is separately assessing capacity 
rather than just rubber-stamping medical opinions.  
 
Section 1(3) MCA has added a new requirement that all practicable steps must be 
taken to help a person retain capacity before they can be deemed incapacitated. The 
MCA’s accompanying Code of Practice states this aims to stop people being 
automatically labelled as incapacitated.25 Whilst the common law presumption simply 
existed without clarification, the MCA’s threshold of ‘all practicable steps’ provides 
patients with a standard of protection, thereby strengthening the presumption. Bartlett 
argues that s.1(3) is not window dressing, individuals should not be found incapable 
because it is inconvenient to help them work through information. 26  Unlike the 
common law, this principle requires assessors to provide evidence of efforts being 
made before a patient is deemed incapacitated. The judiciary must strictly interpret 
‘all practicable steps’ to ensure genuine efforts have been made towards the patient 
                                                        
21
 Bartlett. P., Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, (2008, Oxford University 
Press), p.26.  
22
 Mackenzie, C., Rogers W., ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability and Capacity: A Philosophical 
Appraisal of the Mental Capacity Act’, (2013) 9(1) International Journal of Law in Context 37 
at p.38. 
23
 A Local Authority v K (by the Official Solicitor) Mrs K and Mr K A NHS Trust [2013] EWHC 
242 (COP). 
24
 Ibid, p.23.  
25
 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice, (23 April 
2007) para.2.6. 
26
 Bartlett, Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, p.47. 
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retaining autonomy. Otherwise carers might present facts as if s.1(3) has been 
satisfied without success in order to seek a best interests declaration that satisfies 
their own convenience.  
 
The threshold of practicable steps creates a risk of an assessor conveniently 
deeming incapacity to impose a predetermined ‘best interests’ assessment. In Re 
DE, DE’s capacity was assessed for sterilisation and sexual intercoruse.27 Initially a 
vasectomy was not in DE’s best interests because he could not consent to sex. 
Accordingly ‘considerable work’ was carried out in which the effort spent ‘could not 
be overstated’. Consequently, within two months DE could consent to sex.28 Perhaps 
this signalled a genuinely proactive approach to assessing capacity. This is 
questionable. When DE originally lacked capacity regarding sex, action was hastily 
taken to keep him and PQ (his girlfriend29) apart. Only after this separation caused 
DE to become withdrawn was it considered he might develop the capacity to consent 
to sex.30 Bartlett points out that for DE to have lawful sex, only he could consent to 
it.31 There is no ‘safety net’ of a best interests assessment regarding sex. Hence 
limitless efforts were made only because there was no other way of DE resuming the 
relationship that was now considered as in his best interests. Thus instead of 
promoting the patient’s autonomy regardless of their perceived interests, efforts are 
only made when there is no alternative way of assessors imposing their perception of 
the patient’s interests. This is regardless of the patient’s actual ability to develop 
capacity. Therefore this approach undermines the patient’s protection by allowing 
assessors to circumvent s.1(3) so they can impose their own subjective beliefs 
regarding the patient’s sterilisation.  
 
In support of this argument, the approach to the vasectomy can be contrasted. 
Butler-Sloss LJ opined DE would not gain the capacity to consent to contraception 
‘no matter how dedicated the work carried out with DE is’.32 This is hardly on a par 
with the steps taken to help DE consent to sex. Against Bartlett’s contention less than 
                                                        
27
 A NHS Trust v DE (Appearing by his Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor), FG, JK, C Local 
Authority, B Partnership Trust [2013] EWHC 2562 (Fam) pp.18-19.  
28
 Ibid, pp.27-32.  
29
 Ibid, p.55 note the possibility of PQ receiving contraception was irrelevant. She was 
unreliable at taking oral contraceptives and had a needle phobia. King J also held that DE 
may form a new relationship, thus only his contraceptive status was relevant. 
30
 Ibid, pp.24,27. 
31
 Bartlett, Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, p.46; s.27(1)(b) MCA 
excludes consenting to sex. 
32
 Re DE p.35,52.  
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practicable steps were taken towards sterilisation33. Non-consensual sterilisation falls 
under the MCA, hence the ‘safety net’ of a best interests assessment ensures it is 
lawful. Consequently perhaps there is no benefit in spending time and effort in 
helping patients to consent autonomously. Instead patients are conveniently deemed 
incapable to fit a predetermined best interest assessment. DE developed the 
capacity to consent to sex. Arguably he could also gain capacity to consent to the 
vasectomy. Thus out of respect for his dignity this potential should have genuinely 
been exhausted with efforts that matched consenting to sex. Therefore s.1(3) 
undermines the patient’s protection against needless sterilisation because assessors 
can deem incapacity in order to impose their own subjective ideas.  
 
To inform the analysis it is important to see whether a patient can have the capacity 
to consent to sex but not sterilisation after genuinely adhering to s.1(3). Regarding 
sex, in LA v H Hedley J held the information relevant to sex requires an 
understanding of the mechanics of the act; health risks; pregnancy risks; and that 
they have choice and can refuse.34 In Re K Cobb J endorses Bodey J’s test in LA v 
A.35 The relevant information for contraception and sterilisation is the reasons for 
contraception; how each type is used; advantages and disadvantages of each type; 
possible side effects; how easily each type can be changed; and the generally 
accepted effectiveness of each.36 
 
Clearly, consenting to sterilisation involves a more technical understanding than sex. 
In Re DE, DE had severe learning difficulties.37 Rightly or wrongly there is no duty to 
tirelessly help DE to understand sterilisation. Hence, perhaps his abilities fell within 
the less technical test for sex whereas taking practicable steps could not satisfy the 
more technical test for sterilisation. Nonetheless the absence of explicit reasoning is 
unjustified. Importantly ‘practicable steps’ opens up sterilisation to abuse in future 
cases. Therefore thorough reasoning would ensure genuine protection under s.1(3) 
whilst extinguishing the risk of blurring the lines between the best interests and 
capacity assessments. 
 
                                                        
33
 Bartlett, p.47.  
34
 A Local Authority v H [2012] EWHC 49 (COP) pp.23-25.. 
35
 A Local Authority v Mrs A, by her Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor, Mr A [2010] EWHC 
1549 (Fam) p.64.  
36
 Re K p.24.  
37
 Re DE, p.2. 
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To rebut the presumption of capacity s.2(1) MCA provides a two-part test. A 
diagnostic threshold of an impairment and a functional test that governs whether the 
patient is unable to make the decision because of the impairment. The Code of 
Practice gives an indicative list of conditions likely to satisfy s.2(1) including 
‘significant learning difficulties’.38 Historically, cases have always involved learning 
difficulties that impair the patient’s brain function.39 Therefore although the Code has 
provided clarification, in practice the provision will not strengthen any protection due 
to the typical facts of sterilisation cases falling within the indicative list. Following the 
diagnostic threshold, the functional element must be satisfied. The MCA provides a 
cumulative test:  
  s.3(1) A person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable to 
 (a) Understand the information relevant to the decision; 
 (b) Retain that information; 
  (c) Use or weigh that information; 
  (d) Communicate his decision. 
 
Jackson states that the inability to make a decision must be related to the impairment 
and the test is still issue-specific.40 Thus the substantive requirements mirror the 
common law principles and any ‘autonomy enhancing’ value will depend on the 
judiciary’s approach.  
 
Explicit assessment of the functional requirement would improve the protection 
offered to patients. In Re K, Cobb J noted Dr D’s claims that K lacked capacity to 
deal with the specific issues regarding sterilisation.41 However, unlike previous cases 
of passive agreement he holds that the relevant information regarding s.3(1) in 
sterilisation cases is Bodey J’s test for contraception.42 He then concludes K lacks 
capacity because there was no doubt in his mind that K was unable to understand 
and weigh the information.43 This is the first time greater depth has been given to 
assessing capacity in sterilisation judgments. Although improved, the approach 
remains unsatisfactory. Cobb J does not link the test to how he reached his 
conclusion by stating how the report illustrated K being unable to weigh the relevant 
information. Indeed for there to be ‘no doubt’ there must have been conclusive 
evidence. This lack of reasoning is unfortunate because we are left not knowing what 
                                                        
38
 The Code of Practice, p.4.12. 
39
 Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) (2000) 53 BMLR 66 p.66 ‘A had Down 
Syndrome…impairment of intelligence’; Re DE p.9 DE ‘suffers from life long learning 
disability, which is an impairment or disturbance of the functioning of his brain or mind’ . 
40
 Jackson, E., Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials, (2013, OUP, 3
rd
 edn.), pp.223-225. 
41
 Re K p.23.  
42
 LV v A p.64.  
43
 Re K p.25. 
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constitutes lack of understanding when, for example, understanding the purpose of 
sterilisation. Moreover Lee argues that ‘understanding’ can be manipulated to 
facilitate a finding of incapacity.44 Thus assessors could fallaciously present a patient 
as unable to ‘understand’ information. Considering this was the first post-MCA 
sterilisation case, full reasoning would have set a high standard that double-checked 
doctors were correct to find incapacity. Nonetheless, clarity was given by revealing 
the relevant information when assessing capacity in sterilisation cases. Therefore 
since the MCA we see a more principled approach specific to the issue of 
contraception. 
 
Whether this test will be consistently applied in sterilisation cases is unknown. Re DE 
does not mention Bodey J’s test or s.3(1). The only part of King J’s judgment that 
resembles s.3(1) is ‘DE lacks the capacity to weigh up the competing arguments for 
and against having a vasectomy’.45 This reasoning fails to state why DE was unable 
to weigh the arguments. The judgment documents conversations with DE regarding 
his wishes. 46  Thus conversations must have been had with DE surrounding the 
issues. Hence it is questionable why examples were not given to illustrate her 
reasoning when declaring DE unable to weigh the information. Interestingly, Stauch 
argues that one aspect of weighing information is acting volitionally in light of 
information.47 Arguably DE could act volitionally. King J states that when vasectomy 
is explained to DE as a foolproof method to contraception but condoms carry a risk, 
he chose the vasectomy.48 Section 3(2) MCA provides a person is not to be regarded 
as unable to understand the information if he can understand an explanation 
appropriate to his circumstances. When vasectomy was explained to DE in 
understandable terms he did act volitionally, hence he potentially had the relevant 
capacity. Yet DE had already been deemed incapable by this point.49 Therefore, King 
J’s finding of incapacity because DE could not weigh the information is debatable. 
Accordingly the judiciary has some way to go in ensuring the functional element 
double-checks a correct assessment has been made. Instead they still seem hasty in 
deeming patients incapacitated to enforce a predetermined best interests 
assessment.  
                                                        
44
 Lee, S., ‘Towards a Jurisprudence of Consent’ in Eekelaar, J., Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, (1987, Oxford: Clarendon Press) p.201.  
45
 Re DE p.52.  
46
 Ibid., p.42-44. 
47
 Stauch, M., Wheat, K., Text, Cases and Materials on Medical Law and Ethics, (2012, 
Routledge, 4
th
 edn.) p.107. 
48
 Re DE, p.52. 
49
 Ibid p.53. 
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Issues surrounding a patient’s parenting ability must also be considered. Section 3(4) 
states the information relevant to a decision includes the reasonable consequences 
of deciding either way. A patient must understand, retain and weigh the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of taking or not taking contraception. This was explored in 
LA v A when the Local Authority argued that in contraceptive cases, s.3(4) includes a 
person being able to envisage how to care for a child. They claimed that to exclude 
this would be artificial.50 Subsequently they relied on medical evidence that ‘A lacks 
the intellectual ability to look after a child…independently’51 to show A’s incapacity. 
Without contraception pregnancy is common. If a patient refuses contraception yet is 
not aware of the practicalities of childrearing, the child’s removal would potentially be 
damaging. This likely damage could be negated by requiring a patient to understand 
parenting rather than just conception when determining capacity. Hence such a 
consideration is arguably sensible. 
 
However this was not the outcome in the case. Bodey J concluded that the patient’s 
understanding of bringing up a child was irrelevant. He argued that to avoid 
subjectivity and a paternalistic approach parenting abilities are best interests 
considerations and only relevant once a patient has been deemed incapacitated.52 
‘Learning difficulties’ encompasses a wide range of symptoms; hence some patients 
might be capable of parenting with support. Moreover Howard opines that 
parenthood is conceptually abstract. 53  Thus different people would measure the 
ability to parent differently. Allowing such a consideration in a capacity test would risk 
results depending on whether the assessor subjectively thought having a child was in 
the patient’s or unborn child’s interests based on their ability to parent. Also an 
assessor could be prejudiced and assume a disabled person cannot care for a child. 
Bodey J’s approach provides strong protection by ensuring that patients are not 
deemed incapable due to subjective prejudice. Howard points out that if someone is 
not disabled, the decision to sterilise is not based on parenting abilities.54 Hence it 
would be discriminatory to require a disabled person to show parenting abilities. 
Therefore the law correctly considers parenting ability only once the patient is 
deemed incapacitated to shield against subjective views tainting a genuine capacity 
assessment.  
                                                        
50
 LA v A, p.56. 
51
 Ibid, p.46.  
52
 Ibid, p.64. 
53
 Howard, R., Hendy, S., ‘The Sterilisation of Women with Learning Disabilities – Some 
Points for Consideration’, (2004) 50 BJDD 133 p.135. 
54
 Ibid, p.137. 
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2 Best Interests 
If a person lacks capacity, the law must provide a mechanism for them to receive 
beneficial treatment in lieu of consent. This section will determine whether the 
judiciary is genuinely promoting the patient’s best interests and investigate if the least 
restrictive principle is being upheld when sanctioning sterilisation.  
 
Developing ‘best interests’ 
Re F55 concerned the sterilisation of a mentally handicapped woman and established 
the best interests principle as enshrined by the MCA. The House of Lords held that 
when making decisions for incapacitated patients, the treatment is lawful if it is in the 
patient’s best interests. 56  The applicable standard was the Bolam test. 57  Brazier 
claims this medically focused approach provoked mere rubber-stamping of medical 
opinion.58 Patients were at risk from over-zealous doctors cherry picking supportive 
medical opinion due to a lack of separate judicial assessment. Kennedy criticised that 
the principles amounting to best interests were left unarticulated by the court leaving 
no opportunity for scrutiny.59 Thus the concept was at risk of arbitrary decisions with 
potentially damning effects in sterilisation cases due to historically detrimental 
attitudes towards the learning-disabled.  
 
To some extent the inadequacy of Re F was rectified a decade later. Re A involved 
the vasectomy of a man with learning difficulties.60 Butler-Sloss LJ clarified that ‘best 
interests’ encompasses medical, emotional and welfare issues rather than solely 
medical considerations. 61  Only to consider medical factors was flawed because 
contraceptive sterilisation is not a medical necessity. Considering wider factors is 
more realistic and patient-friendly because it recognises the broader repercussions. 
Additionally, Thorpe LJ endorsed a balance sheet approach to the assessment, 
similar to the checklist suggested by the Law Commission.62 This involved drawing 
up the treatment’s actual benefits and dis-benefits and the likelihood of the potential 
                                                        
55
 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1.  
56
 Ibid., p.83. 
57
 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. In other words the 
treatment was in the patient’s best interests if the relevant doctor’s view was consistent with a 
responsible body of medical opinion.  
58
 Brazier, M., Medicine, Patients and the Law, p.132. 
59
 Kennedy, I., ‘Patients, Doctors and Human Rights’ In Blackburn R., Taylor, J., Human 
Rights for the 1990s, (1991), p.90.  
60
 Re A, pp.77-78.  
61
 Ibid, p.72. 
62
 Law Commission, Report on Mental Incapacity, (15 January 1995, EWLC No. 231) 
para.3.28. 
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losses and gains. 63  Donnelly argues although this approach was more 
sophisticated,64 its mechanist nature was inadequate because it made the test open 
to judicial subjectivity.65 If the assessment requires weighing up two lists, this hardly 
incentivises in-depth and explicit analysis of a complex issue like non-consensual 
sterilisation. Consequently disguised subjective views could undermine the patient’s 
protection. Therefore although unsatisfactory, the Law Commission’s proposals did 
encourage the judiciary to pre-emptively develop a more principled and MCA-
compatible approach.  
 
Section 1(5) MCA enshrined the best interests assessment. Although the principle 
mirrors the common law, the supporting framework might change the treatment of 
patients. Section 4(2) gives general guidance that assessors must consider all the 
relevant circumstances. Hence the MCA specifically prescribes considerations, but 
does not limit the assessment to those considerations. This flexibility complements 
the issue-specific approach and protects patients against needless sterilisation 
because different cases will require different considerations to make a rounded 
assessment.  
 
Patient participation 
The common law approach lacked enthusiasm towards patient participation. The Law 
Commission’s checklist approach included the patient’s participation and his view on 
the proposed treatment.66 However in Re A Butler-Sloss LJ perfunctorily held ‘A had 
indicated no…but it was not an informed no since he could not understand the 
reason for the operation’. 67  Subsequently A’s view and participation in the 
assessment was dismissed. Donnelly claims this approach created a major flaw in 
the common law.68 A’s opinion was sought, but if his participation was disregarded 
because of his incapacity then seeking his view was pointless. The judiciary were 
merely paying lip-service to good practice. Moreover, Donnelly argues, decision-
makers lack fundamental knowledge of what it feels like to be the patient. 69 
Accordingly, notwithstanding a person’s incapacity, a fully informed assessment 
                                                        
63
 Re A, p.77.  
64
 Donnelly, M., ‘Best Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental Capacity Act 2005’, 
(2009) 17 Medical Law Review p.4. 
65
 Donnelly, M., ‘Decision-making for Mentally Incompetent People: The Empty Formula of 
Best Interests?’ (2001) 20 Medical Law Review 405, p.411. 
66
 Law Commission, Report on Mental Incapacity, para.3.28. 
67
 Re A, p.69. 
68
 Donnelly, ‘Decision-making for Mentally Incompetent People’, p.411. 
69
 Donnelly, ‘Best Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental Capacity Act 2005’, p.28.  
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hinges on this vital information. Thus the common law was inadequate towards 
endorsing a patient’s participation and views.  
 
Section 4(4) MCA states that decision-makers ‘must, so far as reasonably 
practicable, permit and encourage the person to participate.’ Donnelly notes the 
provisions recognise the valuable contributions a learning-disabled person can 
provide.70 This requirement provides better balance between capable and incapable 
people through having partial influence regarding their sterilisation. However, 
Donnelly argues that participation must be reinforced to be genuinely inclusive71. 
Therefore unless the judiciary is proactive, the patient’s views will have no more 
respect than under the common law approach. In Re G72 Morgan J disregarded 
s.4(4) ‘by reason of her condition it is not reasonably practicable to involve G’.73 
Notwithstanding the assessment’s potential accuracy, Donnelly claims Morgan J’s 
brash dismissal illustrates the risk the ‘reasonable practicable’ standard creates.74 In 
sterilisation cases patients often have conditions that inhibit communication. 
Therefore the MCA allows dismissive attitudes to deny patients participation due to 
inconvenience rather than impracticability. This is especially applicable where an 
assessor has preconceived ideas about the patient’s best interests. Lee notes 
interested parties can be selective when presenting facts in support of arguments to 
the judge.75 Hence, assessors could tailor facts to show participation is impracticable 
in order to silence a patient’s conflicting view. Therefore the judiciary must take a 
stricter approach to ensure genuine endorsement of participation to guard against 
distorted assessments. 
 
Re K was the first post-MCA female sterilisation case. K had mild to moderate 
learning difficulties.76 Unfortunately Cobb J does not mention K’s participation or her 
condition’s practical consequences. Surely ‘mild to moderate’ learning difficulties do 
not prevent participation completely? The lack of effort towards K’s participation 
becomes apparent when compared with Re DE (the first post-MCA male sterilisation 
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case). King J stated that despite DE’s considerable communication difficulties, his 
carers determined his wishes through doing all that was reasonably practicable to 
facilitate participation. 77  Despite his condition, efforts were possible within 
‘reasonableness’ to ensure his participation. Whilst each patient’s condition is unique, 
the only apparent difference between these cases was that DE had a devoted team 
who were happy to promote his participation. This is concerning because not every 
patient will have the same chance to participate. Considerable room for inconsistency 
remains post-MCA because an assessment can be based on convenience rather 
than practicability.  
 
Section 4(6) MCA requires consideration of a patient’s wishes. Assessors must 
consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable a person's present wishes and 
feelings and the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to. In 
Re DE King J considered DE’s wishes that were not directly related to the 
vasectomy. She held that if DE had capacity he would consider the benefits to his 
parents of the vasectomy.78 Sterilisation cases involve congenital conditions. The 
assessor cannot interpret the patient’s past capacitated views. Donnelly claims that 
assessors may invent patient wishes that accord with their own views.79 Thus an 
assessor could merely say a patient would hold certain views to justify sterilisation. 
This risk is heightened where a third party would benefit from the sterilisation. 
Secondly all parties were confident that DE did not want more children.80   This 
consideration enabled King J to build a full picture of DE’s wishes regarding the 
consequences of sterilisation. Seeking a patient’s wishes on having children 
endorses a patient friendly approach because it does not consider sterilisation in a 
vacuum. However, the judiciary must remain vigilant to avoid considering ‘wishes’ 
that are merely assumptions made about the patient. 
 
King J also sought DE’s view regarding the vasectomy. DE was ‘broadly in favour’ of 
vasectomy yet recently expressed he wanted to use condoms. However, the doctors 
felt this should be disregarded because he had recently been warned of the pain 
risks involved.81 Alarmingly the doctors proactively found excuses to dismiss DE’s 
views that differed from their own but endorsed the views that fitted. Additionally the 
Official Solicitor opined ‘DE … parrots the views of his parents’, hence King J 
                                                        
77
 Re DE, p.92.  
78
 Ibid. 
79
 Donnelly, ‘Best Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental Capacity Act 2005’, p.19. 
80
 Re DE, p.44. 
81
 Ibid, p.52. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2015) 1 
 
181 
 
accepted that DE’s parents heavily influenced him. 82  Donnelly suggests that 
assessors might lead patients by focusing on their preferences.83  Arguably DE’s 
extracted views were merely views that were heavily influenced by his parents who 
endorsed the vasectomy. Thus interested parties can manipulate information to 
influence the patient with their own views. Consequently, the judiciary must remain 
vigilant towards ensuring the authenticity of the patient’s views  
 
Following their questionable authenticity, we must assess if DE’s view influenced the 
assessment. King J submits that attaching weight to a view is issue-specific84 but 
arguably her claim is unconvincing: 
I approach DE's wishes … to a vasectomy with the utmost caution  … DE 
does not have the capacity to consent to contraception; it is therefore for the 
court to consider … his best interests taking into account his wishes in 
respect of not having a baby.85 
 
Accordingly DE’s wishes on vasectomy were disregarded. Despite King J endorsing 
an issue specific-approach she dismisses DE’s view based on his incapacity (status). 
This is unfortunate because as discussed previously, anything but an issue specific 
approach can create illogical results. Donnelly suggests that without enough weight 
being attached to the patient’s views, the MCA will have little effect.86 Arguably where 
the issue is vasectomy, the patient’s view on vasectomy itself is vital to make an 
informed assessment. However, if DE’s confused views were heavily influenced, 
attaching weight to them would have distorted the assessment. Hence King J was 
right to be cautious. In any case, no matter how much assessors facilitate s.4(6), 
difficulties will always arise because by the nature of sterilisation cases most patients 
will have communication issues. Therefore the judiciary must endorse taking the 
patient’s views into account but equally ensure they are undoubtedly the patient’s. 
 
Third party views 
Considering views of others within an assessment is controversial because self-
serving views might distort the perceived patient’s interests. Under the common law 
approach, in Re B, Oliver LJ reassured that the carer’s convenience was irrelevant to 
the assessment; when considering the contraceptive pill he took into account the 
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carer’s concerns that administering contraceptives would be difficult. 87 Lee cynically 
opines he authorised sterilisation for the carer’s convenience rather than B’s best 
interests.88 If B had a child she could not look after, her carers would have had to 
assist in the child’s care. However this does not justify sterilisation. The carers should 
have accepted the ‘inconvenience’ of administering contraceptives to avoid a 
pregnancy in B’s interests. This would have incidentally alleviated the risk of them 
having to care for any future child. Interestingly, administering other medication was 
unproblematic, what would be difficult about contraception is unknown. Ultimately, 
matters of third party convenience were considered under the guise of the patient’s 
best interests. This distorted the assessment and undermined the patient’s integrity 
through insincere motives.  
 
Third party considerations were revisited in Re A. Arguments surrounding protection 
of vulnerable women were submitted as relevant to A’s best interests assessment89 
but Butler-Sloss LJ dismissed this by citing Re Y.90 Here it was established that third 
party benefits were only acceptable if they were incidental to serving the patient’s 
interests.91 Indeed sterilising A would not protect vulnerable women from other men. 
Consequently their protection was too remote and should be considered separately. 
Thus the common law refused to allow considerations that purely benefitted a third 
party. This protected patients to an extent from self-fulfilling intentions. However 
Butler-Sloss LJ stated ‘whether third party interests should ever be considered [is]… 
left open’.92 Bartlett argues that this left the issue unclear.93 Therefore patients were 
at risk from subjective and insincere motives impinging on their best interest 
assessment. 
 
Section 4(7) MCA governs the current approach to third party views. Assessors must 
take into account the views of anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested 
in his welfare. Furthermore Code of Practice 5.48 clarifies that the MCA allows 
actions that benefit other people, as long as they are in the best interests of the 
person who lacks capacity. Hence the Code affirms Re Y regarding third party 
benefits clearing up the uncertainty. The wide scope of views that can be considered 
facilitates a balanced assessment albeit the provision’s practical effectiveness hinges 
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on the judiciary’s approach. In Re K, K’s parents thought sterilisation was the least 
restrictive option whereas the Authority thought an IUS was.94 Cobb J paid significant 
attention to K’s parents’ view but agreed with Doctor Rowland’s that less invasive 
contraceptives were available.95 Herring states that doctors have expertise but unlike 
relatives may not know the patient’s ethical views. Contrastingly relatives may have 
conflicting interests.96 Thus differing views are not necessarily insincere; they can be 
merely from a different perspective and hence deserve consideration. Therefore 
s.4(7) facilitates an all-encompassing approach by recognising each person will have 
a unique relationship with the patient. Consequently the patient’s genuine best 
interests are more likely to be ascertained. 
 
Further guidance is given in Re DE. DE’s parents believed vasectomy was in his best 
interests to restore his independence and because DE did not want another child 
their reasons seem altruistic.97 King J presents that another child would gravely upset 
and impact the family. Hence vasectomy would relieve their anxiety.98 Accordingly 
this might have tainted DE’s parents’ views of his best interests. Realistically 
impartiality would be difficult when another pregnancy would be terrible for them. 
King J cites 5.48 of the Code as relevant and states that she is not concerned with 
the parent’s interests but how their distress would considerably impact on DE’s 
welfare. 99  Lee suggests that the parties’ benefits are not always mutually 
exclusive.100 Indeed sometimes patient and third party benefits are intertwined. It 
would be senseless to withhold patient benefits by being overly cautious towards 
benefitting others. Hence King J employs a pragmatic approach to s.4(7). However, 
Herring argues that s.4(7) allows people to present a patient in a way that will 
promote the order they are seeking.101 Therefore considering DE’s parents’ anxiety 
opens up potential for people to exaggerate matters in order to secure sterilisation for 
convenience under the guise of incidental benefits. Thus self-fulfilling views can 
operate under s.4(7). Consequently the judiciary must remain vigilant when 
considering views of persons who might have an insincere pro-sterilisation motive. 
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Other relevant factors 
The common law recognised the detrimental effects a patient may suffer from 
pregnancy or from a child being removed as a relevant factor. In Re X Holman LJ 
considered evidence that X could not look after a child and that its removal would be 
damaging for her concluding contraception was needed 102 . Herring claims the 
approach focused on the patient’s interests rather than the unborn child’s. 103 
Although this patient-centric approach may disadvantage any child conceived by a 
patient, we do see rightful consideration of the emotional consequences of 
pregnancy. Furthermore the patient was protected from needless sterilisation by 
detrimental effects only justifying ‘some form’ of contraception. The common law 
approach to detrimental effects was adequate by not justifying needless sterilisation 
and holding the patient’s interests as paramount. 
 
As noted under s.4(2) the Act is flexible in allowing un-prescribed relevant factors to 
be considered. Section 4(11) defines relevant factors as those which the assessor is 
aware of and those that are reasonable to regard as relevant. Thus the assessor is 
able to make a rounded assessment by having enough freedom to incorporate any 
issues the facts produce. The detrimental effects to any unborn child are also 
disregarded under the MCA approach as seen in LA v A.104 This article only concerns 
the patient’s interests so it is important to focus on potential detrimental effects to the 
patient. This raises the question of whether a mentally disabled person’s best 
interests can ever be served by having a child they cannot look after. In LA v A, A 
already had two children removed from her but refused contraception, yet Bodey J 
refused to impose contraception holding there was no risk to A’s mental health 
through pregnancy or the removal of a child.105 Herring argues ‘it is hard to believe 
the removal of a child would not cause A grave emotional harm’.106 A wanted another 
child. Arguably she must have felt some loss from the removal of her existing 
children. It is unrealistic to believe anyone could be so detached from their child to be 
unaffected by its removal. If A keeps having children removed, in practice the line will 
have to be drawn somewhere before she is damaged and arguably her interests 
were not served by being left open to the risk of pregnancy.  
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Re DE adopted a more desirable approach. DE could not look after his child (XY). XY 
was subject to care proceedings and placed with PQ’s mother.107  Following the 
pregnancy’s grave consequences on DE’s wellbeing, King J concluded it was ‘in 
DE's best interests to resume the life he had before PQ's pregnancy’. 108  This 
ultimately meant a vasectomy, as it was clear DE’s interests were not served by 
having a child he could not care for. Importantly each case is fact-specific. Herring 
submits it is easy to take the moral high ground but this may leave the patient 
suffering from a distressing pregnancy.109 Imposing contraception must be balanced 
against the detrimental effects of having a child the patient cannot look after. 
Imposing contraception is realistically the ‘lesser of two evils’ in the likely situation a 
patient will suffer from the pregnancy. In such situations non-consensual 
contraception is justified to circumvent this damage. Notably though this 
consideration will only justify sterilisation once less invasive contraceptives prove 
unsuitable. 
 
Least restrictive 
Under the common law in Re B, Oliver LJ held that contraceptive sterilisation would 
only be approved as a last resort. 110  This would require evidence that other 
contraceptives were incompatible with the patient’s existing medication. Thus 
theoretically patients were protected against needless sterilisation. However, even 
Re B (as discussed above) saw a half-hearted attempt at exhausting other methods 
where the carer’s convenience was concerned. Hence the principle was built on 
weak foundations that were easily circumvented.  
 
The MCA had some way to go to ensure sterilisation was not a convenient method of 
non-consensual contraception. Section 1(6) requires the purpose for which the 
treatment is needed to be achieved in a way that is least restrictive of the person's 
rights and freedom: sterilisation will be unlawful unless all less restrictive 
contraceptives are unsuitable. In Re K there was no risk of pregnancy hence the 
least restrictive option was to do nothing.111 This approach is an improvement from 
the common law cases such as Re P where despite there being no risk of pregnancy, 
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sterilisation was still sanctioned.112 Mullender argues the least restrictive principle 
obliges assessors to treat patients respectfully and only override their liberty where it 
is necessary in their interests. 113  Thus s.1(6) provides vital protection against 
needless sterilisation by requiring an initial assessment of whether any intervention is 
needed at all.  
 
Re K also indicates how the judiciary will uphold the principle when females are 
actually at risk of pregnancy. A speculative declaration was sought that should K’s 
interests require contraception, sterilisation was not the least restrictive option.114 
Cobb J submitted that the seriousness of sterilisation could not be doubted so less 
restrictive methods should be tried first.115 Although K had tried the implant, other 
less restrictive methods were available so sterilisation was not necessary should 
contraception be in her best interests. Unlike the last resort principle, the least 
restrictive principle ensures the pregnancy risk is first assessed and if this risk exists, 
sterilisation is not conveniently favoured. With advancements in contraceptive 
technology, sterilisation should be the least restrictive contraceptive method in only 
exceptional cases. Therefore s.1(6) offers indispensible protection against 
sterilisation. 
 
Male cases may provide different results. In Re DE, contraception was in DE’s best 
interest. King J applied s.1(6) by considering the range of male contraceptives; 
ultimately these were vasectomy and condoms. DE received 12 weeks training on 
using condoms yet his technique remained questionable.116 King J concluded that the 
likelihood of pregnancy using condoms was far greater than vasectomy. 117 
Importantly, restricting DE’s freedom would be highly detrimental, as past evidence 
showed. Hence vasectomy was rightly the least restrictive method to secure his 
interests. This presents a desirable approach because all other methods were 
genuinely exhausted before sanctioning vasectomy. Section 1(6) presents an 
interesting result that reverses the common law position where only females had 
been sterilised. There being fewer contraceptive methods for men, sterilisation will 
become the least restrictive method more frequently than in female cases. In practice 
the provision will produce different results according to gender. Nevertheless, if the 
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judiciary genuinely exhausts all other contraceptives, sterilisation should still only be 
lawful in exceptional cases. 
 
3 Human Rights 
Due to the lack of consent in sterilisation cases, human rights considerations must 
form part of a best interests assessment. This section will assess whether any ECHR 
Articles can offer patients adequate protection against needless sterilisation.  
 
Pre-Human Rights Act 1998  
Before the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), sterilisation cases mentioned some vague 
right to reproduce. Re D 118  involved a ward suffering from ‘impaired mental 
functioning’. Her mother sought sterilisation because D could not look after a child. 
Heilbron J refused sterilisation stating it would violate her basic human right to 
reproduce. 119  This shows a high value being attached to reproductive rights 
regardless of mental disability. Dimopoulos contends that at this point rights were 
dominated by emotion, rather than legally based reasoning.120 Unfortunately there 
was no elaboration on the right’s conceptual basis. It appeared the judiciary saw the 
right as so basic that no further explanation was needed. Although the recognition 
offered welcome protection in this case, without clear legal principles the right was 
open to emotion led subjectivity making the protection offered to subsequent patients 
uncertain. 
 
The lack of principle caused the status of the right to change shortly after. In Re B, 
the House of Lords authorised contraceptive sterilisation and confined Re D to its 
facts because unlike B, D could potentially gain the capacity to marry. 121  Lord 
Hailsham confirmed the right to reproduce but stated that to talk of a right to 
reproduce regarding an individual who has no maternal instincts ‘parts company with 
reality’.122 Lord Oliver held the right was of no value if B was unable to appreciate the 
choice. 123  Stauch argues their reasons are unjustified because they lead to the 
dangerous argument that a disabled person has no rights because they are 
incapable of operating them in their own best interests.124 Arguably many patients are 
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unaware of their rights. Nevertheless, to take them away because someone has 
deemed them unable to exercise the right in a ‘preferable’ way discriminatorily lowers 
the person’s status - rights are not dependent on a desire to use them. A non-
disabled person may never want a child yet their reproductive rights are not 
interfered with. Hence to deny a right ultimately based on disability attaches less 
worth to disabled people and defines rights by capacity rather than by being human. 
Consequently the basic right to reproduce inadequately protected patients from 
needless sterilisation. 
 
Post Human Rights Act 1998 
At present there is no guidance on the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR’s) 
approach in this context. There was a brief possibility of clarification in 2012. Gauer v 
France concerned five intellectually disabled women who were sterilised without their 
informed consent.125 They submitted that this violated their rights under Articles 3, 8 
and 12. The application was procedurally inadmissible. Despite the opportunity to 
clarify the human rights position regarding non-consensual sterilisation; the ECtHR 
stated it was unnecessary to examine the further possible inadmissibility.126 Whilst 
Gauer was pending, the European Parliament reported that the case illustrates how a 
legal system might appear fair but is nevertheless unable to deal with cases of 
severe abuse.127 Thus domestic law might be implemented with good intentions of 
providing ways to allow non-consensual sterilisation, for example the MCA’s best 
interest test. However, this does not necessarily mean sterilisation under the MCA is 
not an abuse of human rights.  
 
Article 3 
Article 3 ECHR may apply in this context; it states that no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment. Interestingly Dimopoulos submits that 
interpreting sterilisation into Article 3 is problematic because during the consultative 
stages of the ECHR a UK representative proposed to explicitly include sterilisation 
within Article 3.128 After reservations from other states the amendment was rejected 
because it might have unbalanced the text. Therefore perhaps if sterilisation was 
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intended to be strictly prohibited by Article 3, it would have been included at the 
consultative stage. 
 
Guidance can be sought from indirectly linked ECtHR decisions. Herczegfalvy v 
Austria129 concerned force-feeding: the Grand Chamber held that a measure which is 
a therapeutic necessity (as decided by medical consensus) cannot be regarded as 
inhumane or degrading’.130 Dimopoulos argues that if Article 3 is applicable for our 
purposes it would offer little protection because sterilisation is generally sanctioned 
with unanimous medical opinion that it is necessary in the patient’s best interests.131 
However, any applicability at all is doubtful. Unlike treating a medical condition that 
incidentally sterilises a patient, contraceptive sterilisation is not therapeutic. 
Domestically, contraceptive sterilisation may be deemed in a patient’s best interests 
without being a therapeutic necessity. Consequently contraceptive sterilisation 
arguably falls outside Herczegfalvy’s exception to Article 3. Therefore the court could 
sanction a domestically lawful contraceptive sterilisation that was not a therapeutic 
necessity thereby violating Article 3. This illustrates the lack of clarity in this area.  
 
If Article 3 was applied to incapacitated patients, the repercussions could be counter-
intuitive. In Re DE there was a high risk of pregnancy without contraception. If a child 
was born it would have been taken away and PQ would have left DE, causing him 
immeasurable stress.132 King J had no doubt that after DE’s struggle with condoms, 
vasectomy was the only option to secure his best interests.133 DE was apparently 
unable to consent and his vasectomy was not a medical necessity. Accordingly, if 
sterilisation fell under Article 3 purely due to lack of consent, then as an absolute 
right DE’s vasectomy would have violated Article 3. Instead of protecting DE, the 
restrictions on his freedom would have caused him more distress than the 
vasectomy. In cases where no matter how much the patient is supported to give 
informed consent, if he still lacks capacity, sterilisation would be unlawful regardless 
of the potential benefit. Hence the wider repercussions of a blanket prohibition would 
be detrimental. Therefore Article 3 is undesirable in the context of incapacitated 
patients. 
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Article 8 
Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) might be more appropriate. 
Storck v Germany134 involved a ‘100% disabled’ woman who claimed receiving non-
consensual treatment violated Article 8. The ECtHR held even a minor non-
consensual interference with physical integrity violates Article 8. 135  Hence under 
Storck, because non-consensual sterilisation constitutes an interference with physical 
integrity, Article 8 may apply. Donnelly submits this is so regardless of incapacity.136 
Thus patients who are deemed incapacitated but do not wish to be sterilised could 
seek protection under Article 8 as it has the potential to protect patients against 
needless contraceptive sterilisation.  
 
Article 8 is qualified; paragraph 2 states a public authority can interfere with Article 8 
in accordance with law and where it is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of for example protection of health. The sterilisation must be proportionate 
to a legitimate aim to be in accordance with the law. Here the aim is contraception. 
Arguably this is legitimate where there is an actual risk of pregnancy that would 
detrimentally affect a patient. Regarding proportionality, in VC v Slovakia the ECtHR 
found a violation of Article 8 and ruled the supposed risks ‘could also have been 
prevented by means of alternative, less intrusive methods’.137 Presumably regardless 
of capacity, the ECtHR would endorse contraception according to the less intrusive 
method to avoiding discrimination. Although cases are fact-dependent, there are 
many less invasive contraceptives than sterilisation. Hence sterilisation would be 
disproportionate until all lesser methods are genuinely exhausted. As such this 
requirement and the MCA’s least restrictive principle are mutually complementary. 
The qualifications offer controlled flexibility that ensures sterilisation can be carried 
out where it is genuinely in a patient’s best interests.  
 
To satisfy ‘necessity’, assessors could argue sterilisation is in the interests of 
protecting health. Although much is fact dependent, it is likely the proposed 
sterilisation would be in the interest of the patient’s psychological health due to the 
effects of pregnancy. Therefore sterilisation is potentially justifiable under paragraph 
2 but Dimopoulos argues that Article 8 is undesirable because the margin of 
appreciation would be too wide given the lack of consensus among member 
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states. 138  Although conceivable, Dimopoulos advocates total prohibition of non-
consensual sterilisation.139 Here I am arguing for a genuine approach to assessing 
capacity and best interests whilst exhausting lesser methods first, after all a total 
prohibition might be more detrimental to a patient than sterilisation. Hence despite a 
wide margin, proportionality as complemented by adherence to the least restrictive 
principle would endorse adequate protection for patients. Therefore Article 8 is the 
most desirable article in this context. 
 
Post-MCA cases illuminate the domestic approach towards Article 8. Re DE explicitly 
examines Article 8.140 Unlike Storck, although non-consensual DE was ‘broadly in 
favour of the idea.141’ Nevertheless, King J held the vasectomy engaged Article 8 due 
to Evans v UK where the Grand Chamber held reproductive rights derive from the 
respect to private life because private life ‘incorporates the right to respect for both 
the decisions to become and not become a parent’. 142 Since the MCA, the court 
must consider the patient’s wishes. DE’s wish to not have any more children 
ultimately required a vasectomy. Subsequently King J concluded that DE had 
competing rights under Article 8. Namely that a vasectomy would prevent a future 
choice to become a parent contrasted with a right to respect for autonomy regarding 
his present wish not to have more children.143 Clearly in-depth consideration was 
given to DE’s Article 8 rights based on his specific circumstances. It would be 
interesting here if the facts were different and DE wanted more children. Perhaps if 
this were so the right to choose to reproduce would have had more bearing in the 
assessment. Harpwood points out that King J’s analysis illustrates that Article 8 
points that arise in the context of best interests can be considered under s.4.144 
Although much is unclear, Article 8 is positively implicated in sterilisation cases under 
the right to choose to become a genetic parent. As is desirable this right is not 
absolute, it is flexible enough to take into account the whole picture when 
determining a patient’s genuine best interests.  
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Article 12 
Article 12 states that men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry 
and to found a family according to national laws. Looking at ECtHR trends towards 
Article 12 will illuminate the question of its applicability. Erikkson suggests that Article 
12 was a reaction against racist Nazi reproductive policies and European 
eugenics.145 Thus it would be logical for patients to be protected under Article 12, 
considering its establishment was directly related to non-consensual sterilisation. In X 
and Y v UK the ECtHR held ‘it is implicit in Article 12 that it guarantees a right to 
procreate’.146 Eijkholt notes this shows early case law was favourable in interpreting 
the right to found a family as a right to procreate.147 Hence there is a strong argument 
in turning to Article 12 when asserting reproductive rights. Despite this historical 
recognition the ECtHR has recently shown disfavour towards Article 12. In SH v 
Austria the ECtHR held Article 12 does not guarantee a right to conceive.148 This 
confirmed the earlier ruling in Sijakova where despite having already declared the 
claim inadmissible the ECtHR explicitly stated ‘Article 12 of the Convention does not 
guarantee a right to procreation’. 149 Eijkholt argues this convincingly signals that 
Article 12 does not offer any legal foundation for the right to procreate.150 Hence if the 
ECtHR is currently approaching reproductive rights through other articles, the 
domestic approach should follow. This may explain why King J did not mention 
Article 12 in Re DE. Therefore Article 12 is potentially no longer appropriate when 
asserting reproductive rights. 
 
Even if the ECtHR reverted back to Article 12, in practice it might not offer any 
protection for our purposes. Dimopoulos claimed that reproduction does not fall 
under Article 12 unless it is within marriage.151 In the history of sterilisation cases a 
patient has never been married so Dimopoulos’ Article 12 submission would be 
obsolete in offering protection in this context. The Commission argued that even if 
the right to reproduce can exist without marriage, Article 12 recognises the existence 
of a couple as fundamental to its exercise.152 Thus Liu doubts whether a single 
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individual can assert any reproductive rights under Article 12.153  This is vital for 
sterilisation cases because most patients in this context are single. Hence its 
application is too restrictive to have any consistent value in sterilisation cases. 
Contrastingly, Eijkholt states Article 8 is facilitative regarding reproductive rights 
because it applies to everyone.154 Therefore Article 12 is not desirable due to its 
restrictive scope and the current ECtHR approach.  
 
Conclusion 
The post-MCA approach to capacity has improved since the common law which 
ultimately denied patients a thorough capacity assessment. Capacity is now 
recognised as a genuine starting point and clarification has been given regarding the 
relevant information in sterilisation cases. The exclusion of parenting abilities within 
the assessment continues to be a valuable tool against detrimental third party views. 
However there is ample chance for detrimental subjectivity and prejudicial views to 
covertly operate under the ‘practicable steps’ standard. Furthermore the judiciary is 
still not explicitly and thoroughly analysing the patient’s abilities within the functional 
test, hence the approach harbours a risk of covert subjectivity. Consequently these 
weaknesses allow for capacity to be judged on convenience. This risks defeating 
contraceptive autonomy in favour of a predetermined best interests assessment. 
Therefore the judicial approach, although improved, still inadequately protects 
patients against needless sterilisation. 
 
A best interests assessment must genuinely promote the patient’s interests and 
strictly adhere to the least restrictive principle to adequately protect a patient. The 
common law assessment lacked thorough analysis, denied patients participation and 
was uncertain regarding third party views thereby risking the assessment’s accuracy. 
The approach has improved post-MCA by endorsing patient involvement in some 
cases, considering a wide range of views and providing clarity that the patient’s 
interests are paramount. Furthermore under the post-MCA judicial approach and due 
to contraceptive advances, sterilisation should be a true exception. Interestingly this 
research has provided a significant finding that in practice, unlike the common law, 
the least restrictive principle will result in male vasectomy being the less restrictive 
option more frequently than female sterilisation. Unfortunately the research has 
discovered that participation can still be completely excluded without justification or 
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tenuously circumvented. This risks an uninformed assessment. Additionally 
assessors can choose only to consider views that fit their own idea of the patient’s 
best interests. Moreover third parties with insincere intentions can promote their own 
interests under the guise of promoting the patient’s interests. Thus a best interest test 
can be distorted in a number of ways to fallaciously justify sterilisation.  
 
The basic right to reproduce was weak and easily defeated offering little protection to 
patients. Although there is a lack of certainty in this context, it is concluded that 
contrary to Dimopoulos’ view but supportive of recent ECtHR and domestic trends, 
Article 8 ECHR is most appropriate to offer protection in sterilisation cases. Article 8 
is complementary to the least restrictive principle. It is flexible enough to protect 
patients against needless sterilisation but allows sterilisation where it truly serves the 
patient’s best interests. Therefore each section has determined that although the 
protection against needless sterilisation has improved, it is still inadequate because 
the current approach indicates future cases are still open to uncertainty and distorted 
assessments. 
  
The MCA’s facilitative framework provides the tools for patients to be adequately 
protected but the judiciary must set clear precedent for the MCA’s protection to 
become reality. Accordingly the following courses of action are needed. The judiciary 
must genuinely take all practicable steps to endorse autonomy. They must 
thoroughly and explicitly assess capacity to avoid an assessment based on 
subjectivity, prejudice or convenience. In addition the best interests assessment must 
be approached with caution to ensure the ‘patient’s views’ are indeed their true and 
full views. Additionally when the judiciary considers third party views they must 
ensure these views truly promote the patient’s interests. Furthermore the judiciary 
must continue to reinforce the least restrictive principle. Finally future analysis of 
cases involving females who are at risk of pregnancy would give a more direct 
analysis of any improvement in protection since the MCA. 
 
 
